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Abstract. We study the sensitivity of equilibria in the well-known game
theoretic traﬃc model due to Wardrop. We mostly consider single-com-
modity networks. Suppose, given a unit demand ﬂow at Wardrop equi-
librium, one increases the demand by ε or removes an edge carrying only
an ε-fraction of ﬂow. We study how the equilibrium responds to such an
ε-change.
Our ﬁrst surprising ﬁnding is that, even for linear latency functions,
for every ε > 0, there are networks in which an ε-change causes every
agent to change its path in order to recover equilibrium. Nevertheless,
we can prove that, for general latency functions, the ﬂow increase or
decrease on every edge is at most ε.
Examining the latency at equilibrium, we concentrate on polynomial
latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coeﬃcients. We
show that, even though the relative increase in the latency of an edge
due to an ε-change in the demand can be unbounded, the path latency
at equilibrium increases at most by a factor of (1 + ε)p. The increase of
the price of anarchy is shown to be upper bounded by the same factor.
Both bounds are shown to be tight.
Let us remark that all our bounds are tight. For the multi-commodity
case, we present examples showing that neither the change in edge ﬂows
nor the change in the path latency can be bounded.
1 Introduction
We analyze equilibria in the Wardrop model [15]. In this model we are given a
network with load-dependent latency functions on the edges and a set of com-
modities, which is deﬁned by source-sink pairs. For each commodity some de-
mand (traﬃc ﬂow) needs to be routed from the commodity’s source to its sink.
A common interpretation of the Wardrop model is that ﬂow is controlled by an
inﬁnite number of selﬁsh agents each of which carries an inﬁnitesimal amount of
ﬂow. Each agent aims at minimizing its path latency. An allocation, in which no
agent can improve its situation by unilaterally deviating from its current path
is called Wardrop equilibrium.
Whereas the notion of equilibrium captures stability in closed systems, traﬃc
is typically subject to external inﬂuences. Thus, from both the practical and the
theoretical perspective it is a natural question, how equilibria respond to slight
modiﬁcations of either the network topology or the traﬃc ﬂow.
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To analyze this issue, we suppose, we are given an equilibrium ﬂow for unit
demand and increase the demand by ε or remove an edge carrying only an ε-
fraction of ﬂow. How does the equilibrium responds to such an ε-change in terms
of change in ﬂow and latency?
Consider the classical network exhibiting Braess’s Paradox [2]. Suppose a
unit demand needs to be routed from node s to node t. At equilibrium all
traﬃc follows the zig-zag-path. Increasing the demand by 0 < ε ≤ 1, the paths
containing the dashed edges gain an ε-fraction of ﬂow, whereas the zig-zag-path
loses an ε-fraction.
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Latency functions ... ... and ﬂow.
Thus, in general, neither path ﬂows nor edge ﬂows at equilibrium are
monotone functions of the demand. This observation is one of the reasons why
studying the eﬀects of changes might be intriguing.
Our ﬁndings for single-commodity networks are as follows. Allowing non-
decreasing, continuous latency functions, we show that for every ε > 0,
– there are networks, in which after an ε-change every agent is forced to change
its path in order to recover equilibrium and
– the ﬂow increase or decrease on every edge, however, is at most ε for every
network.
Thus, in contrast to our surprising ﬁnding of global instability of equilibrium
ﬂow, we can prove that edge ﬂows are locally stable.
Examining the latency at equilibrium, we concentrate on polynomial latency
functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coeﬃcients. We show that, due
to an ε-change in the demand,
– the path latency at equilibrium increases at most by a factor of (1+ε)p (even
though the relative increase in the latency of an edge can be unbounded).
This result yields the same bound on the increase in the Price of Anarchy, as
well.
All presented bounds are best possible.
For the multi-commodity case, we present examples for every ε > 0, showing
that neither the change in edge ﬂows nor the increase in the path latency can be
bounded. This holds already for networks equipped with linear latency functions.
160 M. Englert, T. Franke, and L. Olbrich
1.1 Related Work
The game theoretic traﬃc model considered in this paper was introduced by
Wardrop [15]. Beckmann, McGuire, and Winston [1] observe that such an equi-
librium ﬂow is an optimal solution to a related convex program. They give exis-
tence and uniqueness results for traﬃc equilibria (see also [4] and [11]). Dafermos
and Sparrow [4] show that the equilibrium state can be computed eﬃciently un-
der some assumptions on the latency functions and many subsequent papers
gave increasingly eﬃcient methods for computing equilibria.
Another line of research examines the degradation of performance due to
selﬁsh behavior, called the Price of Anarchy [8, 11] and the inverse, the increase
of the maximum latency incurred to an agent due to optimal routing [12].
Motivated by the discovery of Braess’s Paradox [2] many similarly counter-
intuitive and counterproductive traﬃc behavior have been discovered. Fisk [5]
shows that considering multi-commodities the increase of one ﬂow demand might
decrease others path latencies at equilibrium. Hall [6] shows that the vector of
path ﬂows and the vector of the path latencies are continuous functions of the
input demand. Furthermore, he proves that for single-commodity networks the
path latency at equilibrium is a monotone function of the input demand. Dafer-
mos and Nagurney [3] show that equilibrium ﬂow pattern depend continuously
upon the demands and (even non-separable) latency functions. More recently,
Patriksson [9] gave a characterization for the existence of a directional deriva-
tive of the equilibrium solution. In [7] Joseﬀson and Patriksson show that while
equilibrium edge costs are directionally diﬀerentiable, this does not hold for edge
ﬂows itself.
1.2 Outline
In Section 2, we introduce Wardrop’s traﬃc model. In Section 3, we establish
global instability of equilibrium ﬂows and local stability of edge ﬂows at equi-
librium for general latency functions. For polynomial latency functions with
nonnegative coeﬃcients, we give a tight upper bound on the increase of the path
latency at equilibrium due to an ε-change of the demand (Section 4). Subse-
quently, the same bound on the increase of the Price of Anarchy is derived. In
Section 5, we brieﬂy present some negative results for the multi-commodity case.
2 Wardrop’s Traﬃc Model
We consider Wardrop’s traﬃc model originally introduced in [15]. We are given
a directed graph G = (V,E) with non-decreasing, continuous latency functions
 = (e)e with e : R≥0 → R≥0. Furthermore, we are given a set of commodities
[k] = {1, . . . , k} speciﬁed by source-sink pairs (si, ti) ∈ V ×V and ﬂow demands
di. The total demand is d =
∑
i∈[k] di. Let Pi denote the admissible paths of
commodity i, i. e., all paths connecting si and ti, and let P =
⋃
i∈[k] Pi. Let
(G, (di), ) denote an instance of the routing problem.
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A non-negative path ﬂow vector (fP )P∈P is feasible if it satisﬁes the ﬂow de-
mands
∑
P∈Pi fP = di for all i ∈ [k]. We denote the set of all feasible ﬂow vectors
by F . A path ﬂow vector (fP )P∈P induces an edge ﬂow vector f = (fe,i)e∈E,i∈[k]
with fe,i =
∑
P∈Pi:e∈P fP . The total ﬂow on edge e is fe =
∑
i∈[k] fe,i. The la-
tency of an edge e ∈ E is given by e(fe) and the latency of a path p is given
by the sum of the edge latencies P (f) =
∑
e∈P e(fe). The weighted average
latency of commodity i ∈ [k] is given by Li(f) =
∑
e∈E e(fe) · fe,i. Finally, the
total cost of a ﬂow is deﬁned as C(f) =
∑
P∈P P (fP )fP and can be expressed
as C(f) =
∑
e∈E e(fe)fe. We drop the argument f whenever it is clear from the
context. Whenever we consider a single-commodity network, we further drop the
index i.
A ﬂow vector is considered stable when no fraction of the ﬂow can improve its
sustained latency by moving unilaterally to another path. Such a stable state is
generally known as Nash equilibrium. In our model a ﬂow is stable if and only if
all used paths have the same minimal latency, whereas unused paths may have
larger latency. We call such a ﬂow Wardrop equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. A feasible ﬂow vector f is at Wardrop equilibrium if for every
commodity i ∈ [k] and paths P1, P2 ∈ Pi with fP1 > 0 it holds that P1(f) ≤
P2(f).
It is well-known that Wardrop equilibria are exactly those allocations that min-
imize the following potential function introduced in [1]:
Φ(f) =
∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
e(u)du .
The allocations in equilibrium do not only all have the same (optimal) potential
but they also impose the same latencies on all edges. Thus, the path latencies
Li = Li(f) at equilibrium is uniquely determined. In this sense, the Wardrop
equilibrium is essentially unique ([1], [4], [11]).
3 Sensitivity of Equilibrium Flows
For most of the paper we concentrate on the single-commodity case. First, for
any given ε > 0, we present a network with linear latency functions, in which
every agent needs to change its current path to recover equilibrium. Then we
prove, that due to ε-changes the ﬂow on every edge does not change by more
than ε.
3.1 Instability of Equilibria: Every Agent Needs to Move
In [14] Roughgarden uses the generalized Braess graphs to show, that the path
latency at equilibrium can arbitrarily decrease by removing several edges from
a network. Our deﬁnition of Bk diﬀers from the deﬁnition in [14] in the non-
constant latency functions.
162 M. Englert, T. Franke, and L. Olbrich
s
w3
v3
v2
v1
w2
w1
t
3x
6x
9x
0
0
0
9x
6x
3x
1
1
1
1
s
w3
v3
v2
v1
w2
w1
t
1/3
1/3
1/3
0
0
0
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
Fig. 1. Having unit demand, the solid paths in Bk=3 carry 1/3 of ﬂow each and the
dashed edges carry zero ﬂow. After increasing the demand by (1 + ε) = (1 + 1/3), the
solid paths lose all their ﬂow and the paths containing the dashed edges gain ﬂow of
(1 + ε)/(k + 1) = 1/3 each.
Deﬁnition 2. For every k ∈ N, let Bk = (Vk, Ek) be the graph with Vk =
{s, v1, . . . , vk, w1, . . . , wk, t} and Ek = {(s, vi), (vi, wi), (wi, t) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪
{(vi, wi−1) : 2 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {(s, wk)} ∪ {(v1, t)}. Let Bk be equipped with the
following latency functions.
– kvi,wi(x) = 0 and 
k
s,vk−i+1(x) = 
k
wi,t(x) = i · k · x for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
– kvi,wi−1(x) = 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k and
– ks,wk(x) = 
k
v1,t(x) = 1.
Let Bk be called the kth Braess graph.
Let ε > 0 and consider the instance (B1/ε, 1, ).
Let (P1, . . . , P2k+1)T=(Ps,wk,t, Ps,vk,wk,t, Ps,vk,wk−1,t, Ps,vk−1,wk−1,t, . . . , Ps,v1,t)
T
denote the corresponding path vector. The equilibrium ﬂow is described by the
vector (fPj ) of path ﬂows
fPj =
{
0 for j = 1, 3, . . . , 2k + 1
1/k for j = 2, 4, . . . , 2k
summing up to
∑
P fP =
∑2k+1
j=1 fPj = 1.
All paths have path length P (f) = k + 1 and since any unilateral deviation
strictly increases the sustained latency, the edge ﬂows in equilibrium are unique
(Figure 1).
Increasing the demand by (1 + ε), the equilibrium ﬂow vector becomes (f ′Pj )
with
f ′Pj =
{
(1 + ε)/(k + 1) for j = 1, 3, . . . , 2k + 1
0 for j = 2, 4, . . . , 2k
summing up to
∑
P f
′
P =
∑2k+1
j=1 f
′
Pj
= 1 + ε. The path latency can easily be
computed to be 1 + k
2(1+ε)
k+1 .
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Note that the path ﬂow decomposition in equilibrium does not need to be
unique. Nevertheless, we have uniqueness in Bk.
Deﬁnition 3. An edge e ∈ E carrying ﬂow of at most ε is called ε-edge.
Theorem 1. Let ε > 0 and consider (B 1ε , 1, ). Then, increasing the ﬂow by
ε causes the entire demand to be redistributed to recover a Wardrop equilib-
rium, i.e., every agent is forced to change its path. Adding another edge to the
network, one can achieve the same result for the removal of an ε-edge.
Proof. For the path ﬂow vector (fPj ) and (f ′Pj ) it holds, that, fPj = 0 ⇔ f ′Pj > 0
and fPj > 0 ⇔ f ′Pj = 0. For the second assertion, simply simulate a demand
increase by directly connecting source s with sink t and choose the latency
function, such that (s, t) carries an ε-fraction of ﬂow. Then remove this edge.
unionsq
Let us remark that under mild conditions on the latency functions Theorem 1
can easily be transferred to optimal ﬂows, i.e., ﬂows minimizing the total cost.
This is since optimal ﬂows are Wardrop equilibria with respect to the so-called
marginal cost functions he(x) = (x · e(x))′ = e(x) + x · ′e(x), if x · e(x) are
diﬀerentiable, convex functions for e ∈ E (see [1]). Thus, it is suﬃcient to change
the linear latency functions in B 1ε .
3.2 Edge Flows Are Locally Stable
Let f, f ′ ∈ F be feasible ﬂows for demands d ≤ d′ and let Δ(f, f ′) denote the
diﬀerence of f ′ and f ,
(Δ(f, f ′))e = f ′e − fe , ∀e ∈ E .
An edge e is positive (with respect to f ′ and f), if f ′e − fe > 0, and negative
if f ′e − fe < 0. A path is positive (or negative), if all its edges are positive (or
negative). Observe that the ﬂow conservation property holds for the diﬀerence
of two network ﬂows.
Deﬁnition 4. A closed path consisting of ﬂow carrying edges is called an alter-
nating ﬂow cycle.
Lemma 1. Let f denote an equilibrium ﬂow for an instance (G, 1, ) with non-
decreasing, continuous latency functions. Then there is an equilibrium ﬂow f ′
for (G, 1 + ε, ), such that Δ(f, f ′) does not contain an alternating ﬂow cycle.
Proof. Let f ′ denote an equilibrium ﬂow for (G, 1 + ε, ). Assume there is an
alternating ﬂow cycle C in Δ(f, f ′). Since we can assume both equilibrium ﬂows
to be cycle free, we can assume that the alternating ﬂow cycle C contains posi-
tive and negative edges. C can thus be divided into positive and negative path
segments, C = p1n1p2 . . . nk, where pi denotes a sequence of positive edges and
ni denotes a sequence of negative edges. Let ui be the ﬁrst node of pi and denote
the last node of ni by vi. Thus, there are two paths from u1 to vk in C (Figure 2).
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Fig. 2. An alternating ﬂow cycle in Δ(f, f ′). Solid paths are positive, the dashed paths
are negative. Thus, f certainly uses the dashed paths and possibly the solid paths and
fe > f
′
e. For f ′ the converse holds.
For u, v ∈ V , let (u, v) denote the minimum path latency from u to v under f .
For u = s, simply write (v). For f ′, write ′(u, v) and ′(v).
There are two facts we will make consistently use of. Since in equilibrium the
ﬂow routes only on shortest paths, we have
(v) ≤ (u) + (u, v) for any u, v ∈ V , (1)
and
(v) = (u) + (u, v) (2)
if there is a ﬂow carrying path between s and v containing u. We show, that
assuming f and f ′ being at equilibrium yields ′(u1, vk) = (u1, vk). On one
hand, since nk connects u1 with vk and there is more ﬂow on every edge of nk
under f than under f ′ we have
′(u1, vk) ≤
∑
e∈nk
e(f ′e) ≤
∑
e∈nk
e(fe) = (u1, vk) .
For the reverse direction, we show ′(vk) ≥ ′(u1)+ (u1, vk), since then (u1, vk)
≤ ′(vk) − ′(u1) ≤ ′(u1, vk).
In the following, we repeatedly make use of equations (1) and (2).
′(vk) = ′(uk) + ′(uk, vk) ≥ ′(vk−1) − ′(uk, vk−1) + ′(uk, vk)
= ′(uk−1) + ′(uk−1, vk−1) − ′(uk, vk−1) + ′(uk, vk)
≥ ′(u1) +
k∑
i=1
′(ui, vi) −
k∑
i=2
′(ui, vi−1)
≥ ′(u1) +
k∑
i=1
(ui, vi) −
k∑
i=2
(ui, vi−1)
≥ ′(u1) +
k∑
i=1
((vi) − (ui)) −
k∑
i=2
((vi−1) − (ui))
= ′(u1) − (u1) + (vk) = ′(u1) + (u1, vk) .
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The third inequality is valid since f and f ′ route only on shortest paths. Ex-
plicitly, ′(ui, vi) =
∑
e∈pi e(f
′
e) ≥
∑
e∈pi e(fe) ≥ (ui, vi) for each i ∈ [k] and
′(ui, vi−1) ≤
∑
e∈ni e(f
′
e) ≤
∑
e∈ni e(fe) = (ui, vi−1) for each i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
Thus, ′(u1, vk) = (u1, vk). We deduce that the latency on every edge e ∈ nk
does not change due to the ﬂow change. Since the same analysis can be conducted
for any path segment pi and ni, the latency of both paths on C connecting two
arbitrary nodes remains unchanged. Therefore, by removing the bottleneck edge
ﬂow in C no edge latency is aﬀected and the alternating ﬂow cycle is eliminated.
We may remove the set of alternating ﬂow cycles in any order. Adding f to the
altered diﬀerence, one gets the desired equilibrium ﬂow for demand 1 + ε. unionsq
Thus, (Δ(f, f ′)) can be assumed a network ﬂow of volume ε, when edges are
allowed to be traversed in both directions. We can now state the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. Let f denote an equilibrium ﬂow for an instance (G, 1, ) with
non-decreasing, continuous latency functions.
– Then there is an equilibrium ﬂow f ′ for (G, 1+ε, ), such that |(Δ(f, f ′))e| ≤
ε for all e ∈ E.
– Consider an ε-edge (u, v) in G. There is an equilibrium ﬂow f ′ for (G′ =
(V,E − {(u, v)}), 1, ), such that |(Δ(f, f ′))e| ≤ ε for all e ∈ E.
Proof. Since the diﬀerence of f and f ′ can be assumed alternating ﬂow cycle
free, it constitutes a network ﬂow of volume ε. To show the second assertion, let
a single ε-edge (u, v) be removed. With the same argumentation as in Lemma
1, we can exclude alternating ﬂow cycles in (Δ(f, f ′)) that do not include (u, v).
Due to the ﬂow conservation property for every node u = w = v, (Δ(f, f ′)) is a
network ﬂow from u to v of volume ε. unionsq
Note, that since every edge gains or loses at most ε ﬂow (Theorem 2), with
respect to the number of paths B 1ε  is a minimal example exhibiting global
instability.
4 Stability of the Path Latency
The latency increase at equilibrium due to a demand increase clearly depends on
the latency functions. Considering polynomials with nonnegative coeﬃcients, the
maximal degree is the critical parameter. Note, that the results in this section
do not trivially result from Theorem 2, since the relative ﬂow increase on an
edge might be unbounded.
Theorem 3. Let f and f ′ be equilibrium ﬂows for instances (G, 1, ) and (G, 1+
ε, ) with polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative co-
eﬃcients. Let L and L′ denote the corresponding path latencies. Then L′ ≤
(1 + ε)p · L.
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Proof. Due to a scaling argument it is suﬃcient to consider monic monomials as
latency functions. For equilibrium ﬂows f and f ′ we have
L =
∑
P∈P
fP P (f) =
∑
e
fee(fe) and (1 + ε) · L′ =
∑
e
f ′ee(f
′
e) ,
and we want to show that
∑
e f
′pe+1
e ≤ (1 + ε)p+1
∑
e f
pe+1
e , where e(x) = x
pe .
Since equilibrium ﬂows f and f ′ minimize the potential function
Φ(x) =
∑
e
∫ xe
0
e(u)du
over feasible ﬂows x of volume 1 and (1 + ε), respectively, it holds that
(1 + ε)p+1 · Φ(f) = (1 + ε)p+1 ·
∑
e
1
pe + 1
fpe+1e ≤
∑
e
(1 + ε)p−pe
pe + 1
f ′pe+1e , (A)
and similarly,
Φ(f ′) =
∑
e
1
pe + 1
f ′pe+1e ≤
∑
e
(1 + ε)pe+1
pe + 1
fpe+1e . (B)
For contradiction, assume
(1 + ε)p+1
∑
e
fpe+1e <
∑
e
f ′pe+1e . (C)
Calculating p · (A) + (p + (p + 1)((1 + ε)p − 1)) · (B) + ((1 + ε)p − 1) · (C) yields
p∑
k=0
ck
∑
pe=k
fpe+1e <
p∑
k=0
c′k
∑
pe=k
f ′pe+1e , (3)
with
ck = p · (1 + ε)
p+1
k + 1
− ((p+1)(1+ ε)p − 1) · (1 + ε)
k+1
k + 1
+((1+ ε)p − 1) · (1+ ε)p+1
and
c′k = p ·
(1 + ε)p−k
k + 1
− ((p + 1)(1 + ε)p − 1) · 1
k + 1
+ ((1 + ε)p − 1) .
In the following we show that c′k ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ k ≤ p. Analogous arguments can
be used to show ck ≥ 0. Hence, we have a contradiction to equation (3).
For any 0 ≤ k ≤ p and ε = 0, we have c′k = 0. We show that c′k is monotonically
decreasing in ε (for ε ≥ 0). The derivative of c′k with respect to (1 + ε) is
∂c′k
∂(1 + ε)
= p · (p − k) · (1 + ε)
p−k−1
k + 1
− p · (p + 1)(1 + ε)
p−1
k + 1
+ p · (1 + ε)p−1 .
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Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that
1
(1 + ε)p−k−1
· ∂c
′
k
∂(1 + ε)
= p · (p−k) · 1
k + 1
−p · (p+1)(1 + ε)
k
k + 1
+p · (1+ε)k ≤ 0 .
For ε = 0, the left hand side equals 0. It remains to show that 1(1+ε)p−k−1 · ∂c
′
k
∂(1+ε)
is monotonically decreasing in ε (for ε ≥ 0). This is the case since
∂( 1(1+ε)p−k−1 · ∂c
′
k
∂(1+ε) )
∂(1 + ε)
=
(k − p) · p · k
k + 1
· (1 + ε)k−1 ≤ 0
and the proof is complete. unionsq
The bound is tight, as shown by the network consisting of two nodes connected
by an edge, equipped with the latency function (x) = xp. Allowing negative
coeﬃcients, the relative increase obviously can be unbounded.
4.1 Increase of the Price of Anarchy
The Price of Anarchy quantiﬁes the degradation of performance due to selﬁsh
behavior.
Deﬁnition 5. For an instance (G, d, ) with equilibrium ﬂow f and optimal ﬂow
f∗ the Price of Anarchy is deﬁned as C(f)C(f∗) .
In [13] the Price of Anarchy is shown to be asymptotically Θ( pln p ) for polynomial
latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coeﬃcients.
Corollary 4. Let ρ and ρ′ denote the Price of Anarchy for instances (G, 1, )
and (G, 1+ ε, ) with polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with non-
negative coeﬃcients. Then ρ′ ≤ (1 + ε)p · ρ.
Proof. Let L¯d denote the average path latency for an optimal ﬂow in (G, d, ).
Let Copt, C′opt, C
∗ and C′∗ denote the costs of an optimal ﬂow and an equilibrium
ﬂow, respectively. Then ρ = C∗/Copt and ρ′ = C′
∗
/C′opt. Since Copt = 1 · L¯1 and
C′opt = (1 + ε) · L¯1+ε, we have
(1 + ε) · Copt = (1 + ε) · L¯1 ≤ (1 + ε) · L¯1+ε = C′opt ,
since the average latency is clearly monotone in the demand. Thus, the increase
of the Price of Anarchy can be bounded by
ρ′
ρ
=
C′∗/C′opt
C∗/Copt
=
L′ · (1 + ε) · Copt
L · C′opt
≤ L · (1 + ε)
p · (1 + ε) · Copt
L · Copt · (1 + ε) = (1 + ε)
p ,
where the inequality is due to Theorem 3. unionsq
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This upper bound is tight in the following sense: There is a network family
(G, d, (p)), such that limp
ρ′/ρ
(1+ε)p = 1 for every ε > 0. This holds for mildly
modiﬁed instances of Pigou’s example [10]. Assume two nodes to be connected
via two edges equipped with latency functions 1(x) = xp and 2(x) = (1 + ε)p.
We calculate C∗ = 1, C′∗ = (1+ε)p+1, Copt =
(1+ε)p+1
(p+1)(p+1)/p +(1− 1+ε(p+1)1/p )(1+ε)p,
and C′opt =
(1+ε)p+1
(p+1)(p+1)/p + (1 + ε − 1+ε(p+1)1/p )(1 + ε)p. Thus, we have
ρ′
ρ
= (1 + ε)p · (1 − (p + 1)
1/pε p
(p + 1)(p+2)/p − p(p + 1)1/p ) ,
and it holds that limp
ρ′/ρ
(1+ε)p = 1 for every ﬁxed ε > 0.
5 Instability in Multi-commodity Networks
There are no analogous results to Theorem 2 and 3 for the multi-commodity case.
Figure 3 shows a network with two commodities, with both demands being 1, in
which after increasing the demand of the second commodity or both demands
by ε, the entire demand of the ﬁrst commodity needs to be shifted to a single
edge to recover an equilibrium state. If a single ε-edge is being removed, other
edges might also lose an arbitrary fraction of the commodity’s demand.
s1
s2
t1
t2
1
x
1+ε 1
x
1+ε 1 1
x
1+ε 1
x
1+ε
s
t1
t2
x
k · x
k
2
− 1
Fig. 3. (left) Unlabeled edges cause no latency. Assume there are 2 ·  1
ε
 − 1 many
edges on the unique path connecting s2 with t2. For d1 = d2 = 1, the ﬂow demand
of commodity 1 is uniformly spread over all 1/ε paths using one edge on the path
connecting s2 and t2. After increasing d2 by ε, we have f(s1,t1) = 1. (right) For d1 = 1
and d2 = k, the path latency of the ﬁrst commodity multiplicatively increases by 1+k·ε
if both demands are increased by a factor of (1 + ε).
Figure 3 also shows a network with 2 commodities. (Insisting on unit demands,
one can split commodity 2 into k small commodities.) Increasing the demands
by ε the path latency of commodity 1 increases by a factor of 1 + k · ε. Simple
examples exhibit an even higher increase.
6 Open Problems
Suppose, given a unit demand ﬂow at Wardrop equilibrium, one removes an
edge carrying only an ε-fraction of ﬂow. How does the path latency change after
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recovering equilibrium? Considering a network with two parallel edges, one gets
a lower bound of 1(1−ε)p . Is this bound tight?
Furthermore, we believe that our bound on the increase of the path latency
holds for a broader class of latency functions, namely for latency functions with
bounded elasticity.
What can be said about the sensitivity of equilibria in related models? For
instance, are analogous results possible in atomic games, where every agents
control some non-negligible amount of ﬂow each?
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